BaselineWatch
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How to read this site

This site does two jobs: it gathers security news in one timeline, and it keeps a change register for the security standards themselves. The ladder below is the frame for all of it — standard, baseline, control, setting — and the terms after it appear all over both jobs; each one links to the page where you can see it in use. Where those rulebooks come from in the first place — the law, the policy and the publishers behind each one — is Learn.

Standard, baseline, control, setting

Four words do most of the work in this field, and they are used loosely nearly everywhere. On this site they mean exactly one thing each, and the menus are built from them: Standards, Baselines, Controls.

  1. Standard the rulebook

    A publisher's document saying how things are to be done: NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-171, a DISA STIG, a CIS Benchmark, FedRAMP's rules, NASA's policy set. It is written for everyone, not for your machine. Standards lists the ones this instance tracks, and what changed in each release.

  2. Baseline the set of rules chosen for your kind of system

    A standard is too large to apply whole, so a baseline selects from it: SP 800-53's Low, Moderate and High sets, the DISA STIG baseline for a platform, Microsoft's security baseline for a Windows release. Baselines builds the strictest published one for a platform and lets you trim it.

  3. Control one specific rule in that set

    AC-2 Account Management, IA-2 Multi-Factor Authentication, CM-6 Secure Configuration. A control says what must be true, not how to make it true on a Mac. Controls is one rule at a time: its text, the rules that implement it, and how it has changed.

  4. Configuration setting how the control is enforced on a device or service

    The registry value, the mobileconfig payload key, the Intune settings-catalog definition, the shell command in a STIG's fix text. One control usually becomes several settings, and they differ per platform — which is why a baseline export comes in a Jamf, Intune or Linux flavour.

The same ladder, twice

A house

Standard: build houses this way.
Baseline: for this kind of house, these requirements.
Controls: a lock on the door, a smoke detector, an alarm.
Setting: this lock, fitted this way, on this door.

A federal system

Standard: NIST SP 800-53, and the agency's own policy above it.
Baseline: the Moderate set, plus the agency's tailoring.
Control: IA-2, multi-factor authentication.
Setting: Intune requires a PIV-derived certificate for every user.

An agency's own layer sits between the standard and the baseline: NASA's OCIO Cybersecurity Standards and Engineering Team takes NIST checklists, CIS Benchmarks, DoD STIGs and vendor guidance and issues NASA-approved configuration specifications from them. Those specifications are internal, so this site tracks the public layer instead — the quarterly NASA Cybersecurity Policy Reference, which lists every NASA cybersecurity document with its dates and status, and diffs like any other standard.

Where the rulebook itself came from

The ladder starts at the standard, but the standard did not start there. A law obliges somebody to act, a policy says what acting looks like, a framework structures the work, and only then is there a catalogue to pick a baseline out of — and below the setting there is a check that proves it. Learn draws that whole chain, names every publisher on it (NIST, CISA, DISA, CNSS, NASA, CIS, Microsoft, the NSA, the ACSC, the NCSC), links each one's own address with what it takes to read it, and traces the same control three ways: down a federal system's ladder, a DoD system's, and a private company's.

The three reading areas

News is the home page: articles from the sources the site follows, plus the vulnerabilities worth an entry of their own. Today is the same material rolled up into one glance at the last day. Vulnerabilities is the full table — every CVE the pipeline has seen, searchable and filterable. Only notable CVEs make the News timeline: ones in KEV, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation; the table keeps the rest.

The Register

The Register tracks changes to the standards themselves: NIST SP 800-53 controls, DISA STIGs, Microsoft security baselines, and CIS Benchmarks from your own copy. When a publisher releases a new version, the Register shows each requirement before and after, what changed, and the publisher's stated reason. Where a summary is machine-generated rather than the publisher's own words, it carries a label saying so.

KEV — known to be exploited

KEV is CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: the list of CVEs with reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild. A KEV entry is the strongest single signal a vulnerability sends — it is no longer about whether someone might attack it, because someone already has. US federal agencies are required to remediate KEV entries by a due date; everyone else does well to treat the list the same way.

EPSS — how likely exploitation is

EPSS, the Exploit Prediction Scoring System from FIRST, estimates the probability that a CVE will be exploited in the next thirty days, from 0 to 1. It answers a different question than severity: a flaw can be grave but unlikely to be attacked, or modest but attacked everywhere. This site surfaces a CVE as news when its EPSS passes 50%.

CVSS — how bad the flaw itself is

CVSS, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, rates the technical severity of a flaw from 0 to 10 — what an attacker gets and how easily, regardless of whether anyone is attacking it. 9.0 and above is critical. Read CVSS and EPSS together: CVSS for the blast radius, EPSS for the odds, KEV for the certainty.

Public exploits — and Microsoft's own word

A score says how bad a flaw could be; an exploit chip says someone has already written the code. The table reads three free indexes once a day — Exploit-DB, Metasploit's modules and the PoC-in-GitHub list — and the CVE page lists each entry under Fix, linking to the index, never to the code. Verified is Exploit-DB's own flag or a Metasploit module ranked good or better; a GitHub repository is a claim. For Microsoft's products the CVE page also carries Microsoft's update: the KB per product from the Security Update Guide, and whether Microsoft itself says the flaw is exploited or publicly disclosed. Patch Tuesday lays each month out by update and product, your own Windows releases first.

What the News is talking about

A news ×3 chip means three sources named the CVE this week, whatever its score; the CVE page lists the stories under In the news, and Today names the most talked-about. It is the one signal that comes from the News itself rather than from NVD, CISA or FIRST.

Feeds, the calendar, search

Everything the pages show can leave with you: the News and the table as RSS under any filter, every source as OPML, CISA's KEV due dates as a calendar you subscribe to, the same facts as JSON under /api/v1/. The Feeds page writes every address out in full. The box in the masthead searches CVEs, the News, every standard's controls, Microsoft's updates and the sources in one go; a CVE id typed whole opens its page.

The Scan area — what each check can prove

This browser runs in your tab and uploads nothing: whether a blocker hides and stops ads, whether a filtering resolver answers, and what the browser gives away — privacy signals, WebRTC addresses, the fingerprint surface, the referrer. The same page shows what this server learned from your request. A domain reads any domain by lookups alone — SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MTA-STS, DNSSEC, CAA, HSTS, the certificate — and quotes every record beside its verdict. Your network is the owner's: the LAN resolver tested with canary names from this server, and once a day what the internet sees of the public address and what the router gives away. History keeps every run. A device reads what a computer runs from a script's report you paste — the Windows build, the browsers, the packages — and says which CVEs apply to those versions. Signals, not certificates: each row says what it saw, and nothing here contacts an advertising or malware host or sends a packet to a device that did not ask.

Is this device affected? — what a reading can say

No web page can see what a computer runs, and this site installs nothing, so a device is read by a script you run on it — bw-inventory.ps1 on Windows, bw-inventory.sh on macOS and Linux, served with their sums beside the check scripts — and the script prints version numbers and nothing else: the Windows build, the macOS or distribution release, each browser's version, a Linux distribution's packages. You paste that report. What the owner pastes is kept as verdicts and CVE ids under the device's name, never the report itself.

Each line is read against a source that can answer it. A Windows build is compared with the fixed build Microsoft's Security Update Guide names for each update on that Windows version, so a missing update is listed with the CVEs it fixes and which of them Microsoft says are exploited. A browser and macOS are compared with the vendor's newest announced release, a release with endoflife.date, and a Linux distribution's packages go to OSV in one question, where versions are compared by the distribution's own rules — a Debian package whose number reads older than the upstream fix can still be fixed, because the distribution backported it and OSV knows the version that did.

What a reading cannot say: whether an application outside those lists is current, whether a setting is wrong, or whether anything is running. "Up to date" means no newer release is known to the sources this instance reads, as of their last read — not that nothing is wrong with the machine. Read it again after patching; the page says what moved.

The watchlist, and an SBOM

The watchlist is how the table knows your stack: products, packages, platforms, keywords. A software bill of materials (CycloneDX or SPDX JSON) turns into package entries in one upload, so the advisories for what a system actually ships mark it as yours. Versions are not kept — the advisory says which — and nothing else from the file is stored.

CAT I, II and III — STIG severities

DISA grades every STIG rule by what ignoring it costs. CAT I means exploitation directly and immediately loses confidentiality, availability or integrity — fix first. CAT II means exploitation has the potential to cause that loss. CAT III means the weakness degrades the measures protecting against it. The STIG pages count each release's rules by category and show what changed against the previous version.