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4.7 Electronic Cloning

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-116 Rev. 1 against SP 800-116
All changes in this version
removed 4 Threat Environment part of 4

Title changed

Before · SP 800-116

Electronic Cloning

After · SP 800-116 Rev. 1

Electronic Cloning

Control changed

Before · SP 800-116

If an attacker has successfully conducted a skimming, sniffing, or social engineering attack, he or she possesses verbatim copies of some of the data objects from an issued PIV Card. The objects that are signed (e.g., the certificates and CHUID) retain their signatures, and the signatures are valid if the original card is valid. The attacks described, however, cannot copy the private or secret keys needed for cryptographic authentication methods. The attacker is thus able to create a partial clone of the PIV Card that would succeed in CHUID-based authentication, but is not able to create a clone that would succeed in PKI or CAK authentication mechanisms. The PIV Card mitigates the risk of electronic cloning by providing the PKI and CAK alternative mechanisms. It is strongly recommended that agencies use PKI or asymmetric CAK challenge/response methods instead of the CHUID authentication mechanism (see the Recommendation in Section 4.9).

After · SP 800-116 Rev. 1

If an attacker has successfully conducted a skimming, sniffing, or social engineering attack, he or she possesses verbatim copies of some of the data objects from an issued PIV Card. The objects that are signed (e.g., the certificates and CHUID) retain their signatures, and the signatures are valid if the original card is valid. The attacks described, however, cannot copy the private or secret keys needed for cryptographic authentication methods. The attacker is thus able to create a partial clone of the PIV Card that would succeed in CHUID-based authentication, but is not able to create a clone that would succeed in PKI or CAK authentication mechanisms. The PIV Card mitigates the risk of electronic cloning by providing the PKI and CAK alternative mechanisms. It is strongly recommended that agencies use PKI or asymmetric CAK challenge/response methods instead of the CHUID authentication mechanism (see the Recommendation in Section 4.9).