A.4 PKI-Based Federation Gateway 1295
All changes in this version
Title
PKI-Based Federation Gateway 1295
Control
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1328 1329 1330 1331 A service provider that does not issue any PIV identity account of its own sets up a SAML IdP that accepts PKI-based PIV credentials as its only authentication method. These accounts are provisioned at the IdP using the attributes in the certificates when the subscriber first presents the certificate. The IdP collects no additional attributes from the subscriber in the process.
The IdP generates federated identifiers for the accounts by computing a hash of the authentication certificate and encoding that hash in Base64. This process fulfills the requirements of this document for federated identifiers, but it is specific to this IdP and need not be known or understood by any RP connecting through the IdP. If the subscriber changes any attributes in the certificate (e.g., their name), then a new federated identifier will be created as a result. As a result, this IdP does not necessarily provide a stable subject identifier across authenticator updates.
The RP enters into a pairwise trust agreement with the IdP to accept assertions for any agency with PIV credentials. The RP does not have any other IdPs that it speaks to directly, and so the only way to log in to the RP is through this gateway. Since the IdP accepts a broad range of PKI-based credentials, this allows the RP access to any account based on those credentials.
This setup does not allow the PIV identity accounts to use non-PKI-based derived PIV credentials since the IdP portion of the gateway is not the home agency IdP for any of the accounts in question. The RP is also not able to receive any attributes other than those available directly to the IdP through subscriber certificates. To ensure account continuity, an RP would need to have an out-of-band process to bind their new federated identifier to the existing RP subscriber account if the certificate and attributes change over time.
The IdP is not acting as a federation proxy because the inbound credential is not a federated assertion but rather a PKI-based credential that the gateway processes directly as a verifier.