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3 Digital Identity Risk Management (was: Definitions and Abbreviations)

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-63-4 against SP 800-63-3
All changes in this version
modified 3 Digital Identity Risk Management

Title changed

Before · SP 800-63-3

Definitions and Abbreviations

After · SP 800-63-4

DefinitionsDigital andIdentity AbbreviationsRisk Management

Control changed

Before · SP 800-63-3

See Appendix A for a complete set of definitions and abbreviations.

After · SP 800-63-4

SeeThis Appendixsection Ais normative.

This section describes the methodology
for assessing digital identity risks associated with online services, including residual risks to users of the online service, the service provider organization, and its mission and business partners. It offers guidance on selecting usable, privacy-enhancing security, and anti-fraud controls that mitigate those risks. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of continuously evaluating the performance of the selected controls.

The Digital Identity Risk Management (DIRM) process focuses on the identification and management of risks according to two dimensions: (1) risks that result from operating the online service that might be addressed by an identity system and (2) additional risks that are introduced as
a completeresult setof implementing the identity system.

The first dimension
of definitionsrisk informs initial assurance level selections and abbreviationsseeks to identify risks associated with a compromise of the online service that might be addressed by an identity system. For example:

• Identity proofing: Negative impacts that could reasonably be expected if an imposter were to gain access to a service or receive a credential using the identity of a legitimate user (e.g., an attacker successfully impersonates someone)

• Authentication: Negative impacts that could reasonably be expected if a false claimant accessed an account that was not rightfully theirs (e.g., an attacker who compromises or steals an authenticator), often referred to as an account takeover attack

• Federation: Negative impacts that could reasonably be expected if the wrong subject successfully accessed an online service, system, or data (e.g., compromising or replaying an assertion)

If there are risks associated with a compromise of the online service that could be addressed by an identity system, an initial assurance level is selected and the second dimension of risk is then considered.

The second dimension of risk seeks to identify the risks posed by the identity system itself and informs the tailoring process. Tailoring provides a process to modify an initially assessed assurance level, implement compensating or supplemental controls, or modify selected controls based on ongoing detailed risk assessments in areas such as privacy, usability, and resilience to real-world threats.

Examples of the types of impact that can result from risks introduced by the identity system itself include:
• Identity proofing: Impacts of not successfully identity proofing and enrolling a legitimate subject due to barriers faced by the subject throughout the process of identity proofing, falling victim to a breach of information that was collected and retained to support identity proofing processes, or the initial IAL failing to completely address specific threats, threat actors, and fraud

• Authentication: Impacts of failing to authenticate the correct subject due to barriers faced by the subject in presenting their authenticator, including barriers due to usability issues; the initial AAL failing to completely address targeted account takeover models or specific authenticator types fail to mitigate anticipated attacks

• Federation: Impacts of releasing real subscriber attributes to the wrong online service or system or releasing incorrect or fake attributes to a legitimate RP

The outcomes of the DIRM process depend on the role that an entity plays within the digital identity model.