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3.2.5 Phishing Resistance

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-63B-4 against SP 800-63B
All changes in this version
added 3 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements part of 3.2

Title changed

Before · SP 800-63B

After · SP 800-63B-4

Phishing Resistance

Control changed

Before · SP 800-63B

After · SP 800-63B-4

Phishing attacks, previously referred to in SP 800-63B as “verifier impersonation,” are attempts by fraudulent verifiers and RPs to fool an unwary claimant into presenting an authenticator to an impostor. In some prior versions of SP 800-63, protocols that are resistant to phishing attacks were also referred to as “strongly MitM-resistant.”

In this document, phishing resistance is the ability of the authentication protocol to prevent the disclosure of authentication secrets and valid authenticator outputs to an impostor verifier (i.e., an attacker fraudulently posing as the verifier) without relying on the vigilance of the claimant. How the claimant is directed to the impostor verifier is not relevant. For example, regardless of whether the claimant was directed there via search engine optimization or prompted by email, it is considered to be a phishing attack.

Approved cryptographic algorithms SHALL be used to establish phishing resistance where required. Keys used for this purpose SHALL provide at least the minimum security strength specified in the latest revision of [SP800-131A] (i.e., 112 bits as of the date of this publication).

Phishing resistance requires single- or multi-factor cryptographic authentication. Authenticators that involve the manual entry of an authenticator output (e.g., out-of- band and OTP authenticators) SHALL NOT be considered phishing-resistant because the manual entry does not bind the authenticator output to the specific session being authenticated. For example, an impostor verifier could relay an authenticator output to the verifier and successfully authenticate.

Two methods of phishing resistance are recognized: channel binding and verifier name binding. Channel binding is considered more secure than verifier name binding because it is not vulnerable to the misissuance or misappropriation of verifier certificates, but both methods satisfy the requirements for phishing resistance.