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9.2 Notice and Consent

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-63C
All changes in this version
first version loaded 9 Privacy Considerations part of 9

Title

Notice and Consent

Control

To build subscriber trust in federation, subscribers need to be able to develop reliable assumptions about how their information is being processed. For instance, it can be helpful for subscribers to understand what information will be transmitted, which attributes for the transaction are required versus optional, and to have the ability to decide whether to transmit optional attributes to the RP. Accordingly, Section 7 requires that positive confirmation be obtained from the subscriber before any attributes about the subscriber are transmitted to any RP. In determining when a set of RPs should share a common pairwise pseudonymous identifier as in Section 6.3.2 , the IdP considers the subscriber’s understanding of such a grouping of RPs and the role of notice in assisting such understanding. An effective notice will take into account user experience design standards and research, as well as an assessment of privacy risks that may arise from the information processing. There are various factors to be considered, including the reliability of the assumptions subscribers may have about the processing and the role of different entities involved in federation. However, a link to a complex, legalistic privacy policy or general terms and conditions that a substantial number of subscribers do not read or understand is never an effective notice.

Section 7 does not specify which party should provide the notice. In some cases, a party in a federation may not have a direct connection to the subscriber in order to provide notice and obtain consent. Although multiple parties may elect to provide notice, it is permissible for parties to determine in advance, either contractually or through trust framework policies, which party will provide the notice and obtain confirmation, as long as the determination is being based upon factors that center on enabling the subscriber to pay attention to the notice and make an informed choice.

If an IdP is using a whitelist of RPs as described in Section 4.2 , any RPs on that list are not presented to the subscriber during an authentication transaction. Since the IdP does not provide notice to the subscriber at runtime, the IdP makes its list of whitelisted RPs available to the subscriber so that the subscriber can see which RPs on the whitelist have access to which of the subscriber’s attributes in an authentication transaction. Since IdPs cannot share a subscriber’s authentication information or attributes with a whitelisted RP outside of an authentication transaction involving the subscriber (see Section 5.2 ), the existence of an RP on a list of IdPs does not indicate that the subscriber’s information will be shared. However, if the subscriber logs into any of the whitelisted RPs using the IdP, the attributes indicated will be shared as part of the authentication transaction.

If a subscriber’s runtime decisions were stored by the IdP to facilitate future transactions, the IdP also needs to allow the subscriber to view and revoke any RPs that were previously approved during a runtime decision. This list includes information on which attributes were approved.