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3.16.1 RP-Provided Bound Authenticator Issuance

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-63C-4 against SP 800-63C
All changes in this version
added 3 Common Federation Requirements part of 3.16

Title changed

Before · SP 800-63C

After · SP 800-63C-4

RP-Provided Bound Authenticator Issuance

Control changed

Before · SP 800-63C

After · SP 800-63C-4

For RP-provided authenticators, the system administrator of the RP SHALL issue the authenticator directly to the subscriber for use with an FAL3 federation transaction. The system administrator of the RP SHALL use an independent means to determine whether the identified subject of the RP subscriber account is the party to which the authenticator is issued. The system administrator of the RP SHALL follow the initial authenticator binding requirements in Sec. 4 of [SP800-63A] or the post-enrollment binding requirements in Sec. 4.1.2 of [SP800-63B] , as appropriate. The system administrator of the RP SHALL store a unique identifier for the bound authenticator in the RP subscriber account, such as the public key of the authenticator.

For example, consider an RP that has a collection of cryptographic authenticators that it has purchased for use with FAL3 authentication. These authenticators are each provisioned to a specific RP subscriber account but are held in a controlled environment by the system administrator of the RP. To issue the authenticator, the RP could use an in-person process in which the system administrator of the RP has the subscriber authenticate to an RP-controlled workstation using an FAL3 federation transaction from the IdP. The system administrator then hands the subscriber the bound authenticator indicated by the RP subscriber account and has them authenticate to the workstation using that. The subscriber is now in possession of a bound authenticator supplied by the RP, which can be used to reach FAL3 for future transactions. Alternatively, the system administrator of the RP could send the authenticator to a verified address for the subscriber and have the subscriber verify receipt through an activation process. Since the use of the bound authenticator still requires a valid assertion from the IdP, interception of the authenticator alone is not sufficient for accessing the RP subscriber account at FAL3.