3.3 Firmware Integrity Protection
All changes in this version
Title
Firmware Integrity Protection
Control
To prevent the execution of inauthentic or malicious BIOS code, the integrity of the system BIOS shall be maintained between the verification of the system BIOS by the RTU and the execution of the system BIOS during the boot process.
To prevent unintended or malicious modification of the system BIOS outside the authenticated BIOS update process, the system flash memory containing BIOS (i.e., BIOS flash), excluding configuration data used by the system BIOS that is stored in non-volatile memory, should be protected from modifications outside the authenticated BIOS update mechanisms. If implemented, BIOS flash protections shall be engaged prior to execution of code outside of the RTU and shall be enforced by hardware mechanisms that are disengaged only by an authorized mechanism (e.g., system reset).
If BIOS flash protections are not implemented, then BIOS integrity shall be verified prior to each execution, using the Verification Component of the RTU to authenticate the BIOS image. If the verification fails, then the system shall initiate a recovery procedure, which may involve operator intervention or be automatic. Automatic recovery mechanisms which initiate recovery to a protected authentic BIOS should be supported. Automatic recovery mechanisms mitigate the risk of a denial of service attack, whereby an attacker would load an inauthentic BIOS and put the system in an unbootable state. The system may allow authorized administrators to configure security policies on the server that drive these recovery procedures.
Each RTU shall be protected from modifications outside the authenticated update mechanisms. Protection mechanisms that ensure the integrity of the RTU shall be engaged prior to execution of code outside of the RTU. RTU integrity protections shall be enforced by hardware mechanisms that are disengaged only by an authorized mechanism, for example system reset.