BaselineWatch
Desk

6.2.1.2 Integrity

NIST platform security: roots of trust, firmware and secure enclaves SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4
All changes in this version
first version loaded 6 Training: If the new system requires that new or different tasks (e.g., key part of 6.2.1

Title

Integrity

Control

Integrity protection involves both the prevention and detection of modifications to information. When modifications are detected, measures may be taken to restore the information to its unaltered form. Cryptographic mechanisms are often used to detect unauthorized modifications. The integrity of cryptographic information during transit shall be protected using one or more of the following mechanisms: 1. Manual method (physical protection is provided): (a) An integrity mechanism (e.g., a CRC, MAC or digital signature) is used on the information, and the resulting code is provided to the recipient for subsequent verification. Note: A CRC may be used instead of a MAC or digital signature, since the physical protection is only intended to protect against intentional modifications. -OR- (b) The keying material is used to perform the intended cryptographic operation. If the received information does not conform to the expected format, or the data is inconsistent in the context of the application, then the keying material may have been corrupted. 2. Automated distribution via communication protocols (provided by the user or by the communication protocol): (a) An approved cryptographic integrity mechanism (e.g., a MAC or digital signature) is used on the information, and the resulting code is provided to the recipient for subsequent verification. Note that a CRC is not approved for this purpose. The integrity mechanism may be applied only to the cryptographic information, or may be applied to an entire message. -OR- (b) The keying material is used to perform the intended cryptographic operation. If the use of the keying material produces incorrect results, or the data is inconsistent in the context of the application, then the received keying material may have been corrupted. The response to the detection of an integrity failure will vary, depending on the specific environment. Improper error handling can allow attacks (e.g., side channel attacks). A security policy (see [ SP800-57, Part 2 ]) should define the response to such an event. For example, if an error is detected in the received information, and the receiver requires that the information is entirely correct (e.g., the receiver cannot proceed when the information is in error), then: a. The information should not be used, b. The recipient may request that the information be resent (retransmissions should be limited to a predetermined maximum number of times), and c. Information related to the incident should be stored in an audit log to later identify the source of the error.