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8.2 Operational Phase

NIST platform security: roots of trust, firmware and secure enclaves SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 against SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4
All changes in this version
modified 8 Transition: A transition plan should be developed and followed so that the changeover part of 8

Title

Operational Phase

Control changed

Before · SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4

Keying material used during the cryptoperiod of a key is often stored for easy access as needed. During storage, the keying material shall be protected as specified in Section 6.2.2 . During normal use, the keying material is stored either on the device or module that uses that material, or on an immediately accessible storage media. When the keying material is required for operational use, the keying material is acquired from immediately accessible storage when not present in active memory within the device or module. To provide continuity of operations when the keying material becomes unavailable for use from normal operational storage during its cryptoperiod (e.g., because the material is lost or corrupted), keying material may need to be recoverable. If an analysis of system operations indicates that the keying material needs to be recoverable, then the keying material shall either be backed up (see Section 8.2.2.1 ), or the system shall be designed to allow reconstruction (e.g., re-derivation) of the keying material. Retrieving or reconstructing keying material from backup or an archive is commonly known as key recovery (see Section 8.2.2.2 ). At the end of a key’s cryptoperiod, a new key needs to be available to replace the old key if operations are to be continued. This can be accomplished by re-keying (see Section 8.2.3.1 ) or by key derivation (see Section 8.2.4 ). A key shall be destroyed in accordance with Section 8.3.4 and should be destroyed as soon as that key is no longer needed in order to reduce the risk of exposure.

After · SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5

Keying material used during the cryptoperiod of a key is often stored for easy access as needed. During storage, the keying material and other key information shall be protected as specified in Section 6.2.2 . During normal use, the keyingkey materialinformation is stored either onin the device or module that uses that material,information or on an immediately accessible storage media. When theThe keying material is required for operational use, the keyingacquired materialfrom isstorage acquiredwhen fromrequired immediatelyfor accessibleoperational storageuse whenand not present in active memory within the device or module. To provide continuity of operations when the keying material becomes unavailable for use from normal operational storage during its cryptoperiod (e.g., because the material is lost or corrupted), keying material may need to be recoverable. If an analysis of system operations indicates that the keying material needs to be recoverable, then the keying material shall either be backed up (see Section 8.2.2.1 ), archived (see Section 8.3.1 ), or the system shall be designed to allow reconstruction (e.g., re-derivation) of the keying material. Retrieving or reconstructing keying material from backup or an archive or backup is commonly known as key recovery (see Section 8.2.2.2 ). At the end of a key’s cryptoperiod, a new key needs to be available to replace the old key if operations are to be continuedcontinue. This can be accomplished by re-keying (see Section 8.2.3.1 ) or by key derivation (see Section 8.2.4 ). A key shall be destroyed in accordance with Section 8.3.4 and should be destroyed as soon as that key is no longer needed in order to reduce the risk of exposure; when destroyed, the key shall be destroyed in accordance with Section 8.3.4 .