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6.1 Platform Attestation

NIST platform security: roots of trust, firmware and secure enclaves IR 8320
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Title

Platform Attestation

Control

Figure 1 shows a remote attestation service (AS) collecting platform configurations and integrity measurements from data center servers at a cloud service provider (CSP) via a trust agent service running on the platform servers. A cloud operator is responsible for defining allowlisted trust policies. These policies should include information and expected measurements for desired platform CoT technologies. The collected host data is compared and verified against the policies, and a report is generated to record the relevant trust information in the AS database. Figure 1: Notional Example of Remote Attestation Service

Platform attestation can be extended to include application integrity or the measurement and verification of the hypervisor container runtime interface (CRI) and applications installed on bare-metal servers. During boot time, an application agent on the server can measure operator- specified files and directories that pertain to particular applications. An allowlist trust policy can be defined to include these expected measurements, and this policy can be included in the overall trust assessment of the platform in the remote AS. By extending measurements to a platform TPM, applications running on the bare-metal server can be added to the CoT. The components of the trust agent and application agent can be added to the policy and measured alongside other applications to ensure that the core feature elements are not tampered with. For example, a typical Linux implementation of the application agent could run inside initrd, and measurements made on the filesystem could be extended to the platform TPM.

An additional feature commonly associated with platform trust is the concept of asset tagging . Asset tags are simple key value attributes that are associated with a platform like location, company name, division, or department. These key value attributes are tracked and recorded in a central remote service, such as the AS, and can be provisioned directly to a server through the trust agent. The trust agent can then secure these attribute associations with the host platform by writing hash measurement data for the asset tag information to a hardware security chip, such as the platform TPM NVRAM. The asset tag hash is then retrieved by the AS as part of the TPM quote and included in the platform trust report evaluation. Please refer to the following technology examples in the appendices for more information:

• Intel Security Libraries for the Data Center (ISecL-DC)

• Remote Attestation Service - Project Veraison (VERificAtIon of atteStatiON)

• IBM Platform Attestation Tooling