Greenshot is an open source Windows screenshot utility. Greenshot 1.3.300 and earlier deserializes attacker-controlled data received in a WM_COPYDATA message using BinaryFormatter.Deserialize without prior validation or authentication, allowing a local process at the same integrity level to trigger arbitrary code execution inside the Greenshot process. The vulnerable logic resides in a WinForms WndProc handler for WM_COPYDATA (message 74) that copies the supplied bytes into a MemoryStream and invokes BinaryFormatter.Deserialize, and only afterward checks whether the specified channel is authorized. Because the authorization check occurs after deserialization, any gadget chain embedded in the serialized payload executes regardless of channel membership. A local attacker who can send WM_COPYDATA to the Greenshot main window can achieve in-process code execution, which may aid evasion of application control policies by running payloads within the trusted, signed Greenshot.exe process. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.301. No known workarounds exist.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/greenshot/greenshot/commit/f5a29a2ed3b0eb49231c0f4618300f488cf1b04d Patch
- https://github.com/greenshot/greenshot/security/advisories/GHSA-8f7f-x7ww-xx5w Exploit, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/greenshot/greenshot/security/advisories/GHSA-8f7f-x7ww-xx5w Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.8 · getgreenshotNVD modified 2026-10-19 17:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:getgreenshot:greenshot:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*