vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.11.1, vllm has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config. When vllm loads a model config that contains an auto_map entry, the config class resolves that mapping with get_class_from_dynamic_module(...) and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the auto_map string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets trust_remote_code=False in vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose config.json points via auto_map to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.11.1.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/ffb08379d8870a1a81ba82b72797f196838d0c86 Patch
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8fr4-5q9j-m8gm Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.8 · vllmNVD modified 2026-10-18 18:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:vllm:vllm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*