Gitea's repository migration and pull mirror egress checks could be bypassed with a hostname that returns multiple DNS answers, because the address that was validated was not necessarily the address Git later connected to. A low-privileged user who can create migrations or mirrors could direct the server to internal services, reading from and writing to reachable internal Git or HTTP endpoints. Content from internal responses could additionally be disclosed through migration and mirror error messages.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39010 Patch, Issue Tracking
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426 Patch, Issue Tracking
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-6g2h-xpg3-rm48 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 4.3 · giteaNVD modified 2026-10-15 02:29
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:gitea:gitea:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 5
- https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/ Release Notes
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39010 Patch, Issue Tracking
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426 Patch, Issue Tracking
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0 Release Notes
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-6g2h-xpg3-rm48 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory