Inefficient algorithmic complexity in X.509 distinguished name string conversion (X509Name.ToString and IetfUtilities.ValueToString) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion via a certificate, CRL, certification request or other structure whose name contains a long attribute value made up of characters that must be escaped, such as commas, or of leading or trailing spaces, because each escaping backslash was inserted into the buffer being scanned, so the work grew quadratically with the length of the value. Applications are exposed when they convert such a name to a string, for example to log or display it, or compare it with IetfUtilities.RdnAreEqual, as PKIX path validation does for directoryName name constraints.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/bd03e38bbb49db5be33f4463fc40997400c545cc Patch
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-103604 Patch, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.7 · bouncycastleNVD modified 2026-10-28 13:27
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:bc-csharp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*