Abilityai Trinity through 0.9.5 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the Telegram router that allows agent-scoped MCP API keys to perform human-only binding operations. Attackers controlling an agent, typically via prompt injection, can send messages through the owner's bot token, replace the binding with their own token, or delete it.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 2
- StatusReceived → DeferredNVD modified 2026-10-16 19:18
- First seenCVSS 5.3NVD modified 2026-10-13 14:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/Abilityai/trinity
- https://github.com/Abilityai/trinity/blob/e38c1c0f2567c602541c90c4c92152e99e6ead11/src/backend/routers/telegram.py#L168-L219
- https://github.com/Abilityai/trinity/blob/e38c1c0f2567c602541c90c4c92152e99e6ead11/src/backend/routers/telegram.py#L258-L323
- https://hackmd.io/@haind/rJ2OBa8sfl
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/abilityai-trinity-through-0.9.5-missing-authorization-in-telegram-binding-routes