In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 3
- CVSS7.5 (v3.1, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)NVD modified 2026-10-16 19:17
- StatusReceived → Awaiting AnalysisNVD modified 2026-10-15 14:41
- First seenunscoredNVD modified 2026-10-15 13:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.