CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 2
- StatusReceived → DeferredNVD modified 2026-10-19 21:14
- First seenCVSS 9.1NVD modified 2026-10-19 18:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 7
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/tree/5b6c5374b3fe8b671906c8ab32f6134d9c3da26d/relay-attacks-formal
- https://github.com/ionut-arm/mbedtls/blob/f4ac7593826a506fc509c83cad73786acab1d442/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c#L430-L436
- https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ccc-attestation-sig-attested-tls-poc-through-commit-731ca82-attestation-relay-attack