Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 2
- StatusReceived → PublishedNVD modified 2026-10-28 19:03
- First seenCVSS 9.1NVD modified 2026-10-28 19:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/3fb0ba7e17645bb65611e2a08875d0a2f65c421f
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.1
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-cxf3-9h37-7rr8