abp-next-admin 10.4.0 through 10.7.0 contains a cross-tenant authorization bypass in the BlobManagement download-by-name endpoint, letting authenticated users read other tenants' files. Attackers supply a victim tenantId in the request path, causing DownloadByNameAsync to switch tenant context and return blobs stored by that tenant.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/pull/1633 patch, issue-tracking
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/commit/3ea383093d51b18984652fc9b2d3dcc779a372ee patch
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/commit/fc5e6d5a8a11a65e06fe001fe4a55e414956fc0c patch
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.1 · colininNVD modified 2026-10-30 15:16
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 8
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/pull/1633 patch, issue-tracking
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/commit/3ea383093d51b18984652fc9b2d3dcc779a372ee patch
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin product
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/issues/1628 issue-tracking
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/commit/fc5e6d5a8a11a65e06fe001fe4a55e414956fc0c patch
- https://github.com/colinin/abp-next-admin/blob/10.7.0/aspnet-core/modules/blob-management/LINGYUN.Abp.BlobManagement.Application/LINGYUN/Abp/BlobManagement/BlobAppService.cs#L60-L68 technical-description
- https://hackmd.io/@hieuPenguinnn/abp-next-admin-blob-download-by-name-cross-tenant-idor third-party-advisory
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/abp-next-admin-10.4.0-through-10.7.0-cross-tenant-file-disclosure-via-blob-download-by-name third-party-advisory