A flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler domain notify server. The gRPC handlers for HandleDomainEvent and HandleK8SEvent derive the VMI identity (namespace/name) solely from the request body without validating it against the connection's origin. Each virt-launcher pod connects through a per-VMI pipe socket, but no identity tag is propagated from the pipe path to the server handlers. This allows a compromised virt-launcher process to send forged domain lifecycle events for any other VMI scheduled on the same node, causing virt-handler to erroneously update that VMI's state and disrupt its lifecycle management.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13208 Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492220 Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.5 · kubevirt, redhatNVD modified 2026-10-25 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 2
cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:-:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_virtualization:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 2
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13208 Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492220 Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory