A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13318 Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492659 Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.4 · kubevirt, redhatNVD modified 2026-10-25 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 2
cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:-:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_virtualization:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 2
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13318 Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492659 Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory