IBM WebSphere Extreme Scale 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.6 's Object Query Language engine resolves attacker-supplied class names via Class.forName() and invokes their constructors with no allow-list at three distinct sinks (SELECT NEW, enum literals, and reflection-based comparators); an authenticated remote attacker who can influence an application-built OQL query string can execute arbitrary constructors on the WAS JVM, and a SELECT DISTINCT variant using planted grid values fires the same gadget post-readObject in a manner that survives JEP-290 serialization filters across grid node boundaries
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278593 Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.9 · ibmNVD modified 2026-10-25 21:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:ibm:websphere_extreme_scale:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 1
- https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278593 Vendor Advisory