Missing cryptographic step in the DSTU 7624 CCM mode implementation (KCcmBlockCipher) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows an attacker who can observe encrypted messages of known or chosen content to forge ciphertexts with valid authentication tags, via messages encrypted without associated data. The cause is that the G1 block, which binds the nonce, the message length and the parameter flags into the CBC-MAC, was processed only when associated data was present. Without associated data the tag was a CBC-MAC of the plaintext alone, independent of the nonce. Only applications that use KCcmBlockCipher directly and supply no associated data are affected.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/b01e9e6c0e231b90867fbaf03bf148bde6f9ccfb Patch
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-16000 Patch, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.7 · bouncycastleNVD modified 2026-10-27 16:32
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:bc-csharp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*