Notesnook is a note-taking app. Prior to version 3.3.11 on Web/Desktop and 3.3.17 on Android/iOS, a stored XSS in the Web Clipper rendering flow can be escalated to remote code execution in the desktop app. The root cause is that the clipper preserves attacker-controlled attributes from the source page’s root element and stores them inside web-clip HTML. When the clip is later opened, Notesnook renders that HTML into a same-origin, unsandboxed iframe using `contentDocument.write(...)`. Event-handler attributes such as `onload`, `onclick`, or `onmouseover` execute in the Notesnook origin. In the desktop app, this becomes RCE because Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`. Version 3.3.11 Web/Desktop and 3.3.17 on Android/iOS patch the issue.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://github.com/streetwriters/notesnook/security/advisories/GHSA-f42f-phvp-43x5 Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.6 · streetwritersNVD modified 2026-10-26 21:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 3
cpe:2.3:a:streetwriters:notesnook_desktop:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*cpe:2.3:a:streetwriters:notesnook_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:android:*:*cpe:2.3:a:streetwriters:notesnook_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:iphone_os:*:*
References 1
- https://github.com/streetwriters/notesnook/security/advisories/GHSA-f42f-phvp-43x5 Exploit, Vendor Advisory