Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. In versions 8.42.0 and below, Executrix.getCommand() is vulnerable to OS command injection because it interpolates temporary file paths into a /bin/sh -c shell command string without any escaping or input validation. The IN_FILE_ENDING and OUT_FILE_ENDING configuration keys flow directly into these paths, allowing a place author who can write or modify a .cfg file to inject arbitrary shell metacharacters that execute OS commands in the JVM process's security context. The framework already sanitizes placeName via an allowlist before embedding it in the same shell string, but applies no equivalent sanitization to file ending values. No runtime privileges beyond place configuration authorship, and no API or network access, are required to exploit this vulnerability. This is a framework-level defect with no safe mitigation available to downstream implementors, as Executrix provides neither escaping nor documented preconditions against metacharacters in file ending inputs. This issue has been fixed in version 8.43.0.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/commit/1faf33f2494c0128f250d7d2e8f2da99bbd32ae8 Patch
- https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/security/advisories/GHSA-3p24-9x7v-7789 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.8 · nsaNVD modified 2026-10-26 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:nsa:emissary:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*