n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/commit/d9d847f230923d96e0857ccecf3a4dedcc9b0096 Patch
- https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4ggg-h7ph-26qr Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.5 · n8n-mcpNVD modified 2026-10-26 21:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:n8n-mcp:n8n-mcp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*