PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI's AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string '__subclasses__' is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3c4r-6p77-xwr7 Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.8 · praisonNVD modified 2026-10-26 21:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:praison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 1
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3c4r-6p77-xwr7 Exploit, Vendor Advisory