BaselineWatch
Desk

CVE-2026-40881

6.3 medium SSVC exploitation: poc Analyzed

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-network version 5.0.1, when deserializing addr or addrv2 messages, which contain vectors of addresses, Zebra would fully deserialize them up to a maximum length (over 233,000) that was derived from the 2 MiB message size limit. This is much larger than the actual limit of 1,000 messages from the specification. Zebra would eventually check that limit but, at that point, the memory for the larger vector was already allocated. An attacker could cause out-of-memory aborts in Zebra by sending multiple such messages over different connections. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-network version 5.0.1.

Fix

Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2

Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.

Change history 1

  1. First seenCVSS 6.3 · zfndNVD modified 2026-10-26 21:10

Affected (CPE criteria) 2

  • cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-network:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebrad:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

References 2