In Calico, the install-cni init container logs the rendered CNI configuration to standard output. When the configuration template uses the __SERVICEACCOUNT_TOKEN__ placeholder (Canal/Flannel-Calico deployments), the installer substitutes the live Kubernetes ServiceAccount bearer token before logging, exposing the token to any authenticated user with pods/log permission in the namespace with calico-node. The token holds patch privileges on pods/status, enabling annotation-based attacks against cluster workloads. The default kubeconfig-based authentication path is not affected. This is a direct regression of TTA-2018-001.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 4
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12502 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12526 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12527 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://www.tigera.io/security-bulletins/tta-2026-001/ Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.0 · tigeraNVD modified 2026-10-26 13:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 3
cpe:2.3:a:tigera:calico:*:*:*:*:enterprise:*:*:*cpe:2.3:a:tigera:calico:*:*:*:*:open_source:*:*:*cpe:2.3:a:tigera:calico:*:*:*:*:cloud:*:*:*
References 4
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12502 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12526 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12527 Issue Tracking, Patch
- https://www.tigera.io/security-bulletins/tta-2026-001/ Mitigation, Vendor Advisory