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Desk

CVE-2026-41583

9.3 critical SSVC exploitation: none Analyzed

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.

Fix

Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1

Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.

Change history 1

  1. First seenCVSS 9.3 · zfndNVD modified 2026-10-26 18:10

Affected (CPE criteria) 2

  • cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-script:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebrad:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

References 1