Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the Netty Redis codec encoder (RedisEncoder) writes user-controlled string content directly to the network output buffer without validating or sanitizing CRLF (\r\n) characters. Since the Redis Serialization Protocol (RESP) uses CRLF as the command/response delimiter, an attacker who can control the content of a Redis message can inject arbitrary Redis commands or forge fake responses. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.1 · nettyNVD modified 2026-10-26 17:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 2
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory