Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: "NONE" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 10.0NVD modified 2026-10-24 20:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 4
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GdHT2s5hMYCiHt4zrWt1q58mvL7WQC0M/view?usp=sharing
- https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/commit/5716aeba3bc1e1d34fba9567ff88917ede4a78a5
- https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96
- https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-mjx5-98jq-q736