ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.4.0, prior to zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and prior to zebra-network version 6.0.0, several inbound deserialization paths in Zebra allocated buffers sized against generic transport or block-size ceilings before the tighter protocol or consensus limits were enforced. An unauthenticated or post-handshake peer could therefore force the node to preallocate and parse for orders of magnitude more data than the protocol intended, across headers messages, equihash solutions in block headers, Sapling spend vectors in V5/V4 transactions, and coinbase script bytes in blocks. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.4.0, zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and zebra-network version 6.0.0.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-438q-jx8f-cccv Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.3 · zfndNVD modified 2026-10-26 18:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 3
cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-chain:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-network:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebrad:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
References 1
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-438q-jx8f-cccv Exploit, Vendor Advisory