Termix is a web-based server management platform with SSH terminal, tunneling, and file editing capabilities. The `POST /users/totp/disable` and `POST /users/totp/backup-codes` endpoints in Termix prior to version 2.3.2 accept the account password as a sole authentication factor for MFA-critical operations. An attacker who obtains a user's password (phishing, credential stuffing, the passwordHash leak in GHSA-xxxx) can disable TOTP entirely or regenerate backup codes, without ever possessing the TOTP device or knowing a valid TOTP code. This renders two-factor authentication ineffective. Version 2.3.2 patches the issue.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/security/advisories/GHSA-wqfw-rqj7-fv9m Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/security/advisories/GHSA-wqfw-rqj7-fv9m Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.1 · termixNVD modified 2026-10-26 11:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:termix:termix:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 3
- https://github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/releases/tag/release-2.3.2-tag Product, Release Notes
- https://github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/security/advisories/GHSA-wqfw-rqj7-fv9m Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/security/advisories/GHSA-wqfw-rqj7-fv9m Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory