PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's first-party A2A server example exposes an unauthenticated A2A JSON-RPC endpoint and registers a `calculate(expression)` tool implemented with Python `eval()`. The example also binds to `0.0.0.0`. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send `message/send` to `/a2a`; the request reaches `agent.chat()`, and a real LLM can invoke the registered `calculate` tool. In testing with `gemini/gemini-2.5-flash-lite`, this resulted in arbitrary Python execution in the server process, confirmed by creation of a marker file from an unauthenticated HTTP request. The issue affects deployments following the official A2A example or similar unauthenticated public A2A deployments with unsafe tools. The default unauthenticated A2A surface also exposes task history and task cancellation APIs, increasing confidentiality and integrity impact. Version 4.6.40 patches the issue.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.8NVD modified 2026-10-24 20:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 4
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/e0fb8e7dd1ee6759c18ed07f436c21dbd9c20747
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1793
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg22-4gmj-prxw
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg22-4gmj-prxw