In OpenStack Swift before 2.37.2, proxy-server does not strip internal update headers (X-Container-Host, X-Container-Device, X-Delete-At-Host, X-Delete-At-Device) from client requests before forwarding them to object-servers. An authenticated user with write access can inject these headers to redirect container update requests to an attacker-controlled server, enabling server-side request forgery. The SSRF requests expose internal cluster metadata including storage policy indexes, partition mappings, device names, and when at rest encryption is enabled, cipher text and initialization vectors for the container-level encryption key. The attacker can also cause "ghost listings" in arbitrary containers via the shard-range redirect mechanism.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 4
- https://launchpad.net/bugs/2150261 Exploit, Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
- https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2026-024.html Patch, Vendor Advisory
- https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/5 Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/5 Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.3 · openstackNVD modified 2026-10-25 23:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:openstack:swift:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 4
- https://launchpad.net/bugs/2150261 Exploit, Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
- https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2026-024.html Patch, Vendor Advisory
- https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/5 Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/5 Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory