Trilium is an open-source hierarchical note-taking application. In versions up to and including 0.103.0, the default-on "Safe import" filter sanitizes HTML only for text notes and excludes the mindMap note type, whose JSON content is stored without sanitization, allowing an attacker-supplied import archive to embed a payload that renders as arbitrary HTML. A mind map node can carry a dangerouslySetInnerHTML property that the Mind Elixir library assigns directly to a node's innerHTML, so a malicious note survives Safe import and executes script as soon as the victim opens the imported mind map. On the desktop client the Electron renderer runs with Node integration enabled, so the injected JavaScript escalates from cross-site scripting to full remote code execution on the victim's machine. This issue is fixed in version 0.104.0.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/TriliumNext/Trilium/commit/15da3ff626c21fbadbc980ebb39e2f97085503a4 Patch
- https://github.com/TriliumNext/Trilium/security/advisories/GHSA-rj57-j38v-3577 Exploit, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/TriliumNext/Trilium/security/advisories/GHSA-rj57-j38v-3577 Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.3 · triliumnotesNVD modified 2026-10-14 15:49
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:triliumnotes:trilium:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*