odhcpd is the DHCPv6, DHCPv4, and router-advertisement server used by OpenWrt. In commit cfddd56 and earlier, an unauthenticated host on the same link can first obtain two bindings through normal DHCPv6 SOLICIT and REQUEST exchanges and then send a crafted RENEW containing multiple IA_NA options. An earlier matched IA consumes most of the response buffer, an unmatched IA causes the build_ia() status branch to write and return a NOBINDING response larger than the remaining space, and a subsequent matched IA is processed after dhcpv6_ia_handle_IAs() subtracts that over-return from an unsigned size_t. The resulting underflow disables subsequent length checks and permits attacker-controlled IA_ADDR serialization beyond the 512-byte stack buffer pdbuf in handle_client_request(). The stack canary terminates odhcpd, and sustained packets can repeatedly disrupt DHCPv6 service while procd respawns the process. The observed configuration does not establish code execution.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 2
- StatusReceived → DeferredNVD modified 2026-10-16 20:04
- First seenCVSS 6.5NVD modified 2026-10-13 14:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 7
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/commit/c6792bac3905d4bf726d914e9994f6d4b98c5b57
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/commit/d08dbcc527cb8f296cd132c1e5bca696e77095b8
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/commit/d168c27fb6a55a07ac4c888e09ff2f41e263d7b7
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/commit/d329a15413387027453644cd363dca06ade28328
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/security/advisories/GHSA-7hcw-g2jh-pqv5
- https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v25.12.5
- https://github.com/openwrt/odhcpd/security/advisories/GHSA-7hcw-g2jh-pqv5