Waline is a comment system with backend support. Prior to version 1.41.1, the login endpoint POST /api/token reads the email field from the request body without checking its type and passes it straight into the MongoDB storage query. When email is not a string (for example a JSON object such as {"$ne": null}), the MongoDB storage adapter's parseWhere silently DROPS the field rather than rejecting the request, producing an empty filter that matches ALL users. The endpoint then verifies the submitted password against the FIRST user returned (user[0]), which in Waline is the first-registered user — the site administrator. This is a PARTIAL authentication bypass, not a full one. The attacker still needs a valid password for that first user; this is not a zero-knowledge bypass and it does not disclose passwords. Its concrete effects are: (1) the email/identifier factor is removed for the administrator account, (2) user enumeration (a non-string email never fails the "no such user" branch), and (3) credential-stuffing amplification — an attacker can test a leaked or weak password against the administrator account without knowing the administrator's email. This issue has been patched in version 1.41.1.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 4
- StatusPublished → DeferredNVD modified 2026-10-28 15:24
- StatusReceived → PublishedNVD modified 2026-10-28 12:56
- StatusPublished → ReceivedNVD modified 2026-10-28 13:17
- First seenCVSS 6.5 · walinejsNVD modified 2026-10-28 12:56
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.