Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. Prior to 1.41.0, Logto's self-hosted SAML application IdP built the signed SAML response and assertion by string-substituting user-controlled profile attributes such as name, email, and custom attribute-mapping values into element-text placeholders of a SAML XML template using samlify 2.10.0, which left those placeholders unescaped. An authenticated low-privilege user could place XML markup in a profile attribute so Logto signed a forged SAML attribute, such as an arbitrary role, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers that authorize on SAML attributes. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.5NVD modified 2026-10-25 15:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/logto-io/logto/commit/9097054860f0d638d90778d3dcde2ba050b844b6
- https://github.com/logto-io/logto/pull/9107
- https://github.com/logto-io/logto/releases/tag/v1.41.0
- https://github.com/logto-io/logto/security/advisories/GHSA-vfpw-vq44-4p63
- https://github.com/logto-io/logto/security/advisories/GHSA-vfpw-vq44-4p63