An integer underflow in bt_mesh_sol_recv() in the Bluetooth Mesh solicitation handling (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c) leads to an out-of-bounds write. When CONFIG_BT_MESH_OD_PRIV_PROXY_SRV is enabled, the function parses solicitation PDUs from raw BLE advertising payloads. The AD parsing loop reads an attacker-controlled length byte (reported_len) and computes reported_len - 3 without checking that reported_len >= 3. When reported_len is less than 3, the subtraction is performed in signed int arithmetic and yields a negative value that bypasses the length guard and is then implicitly converted to a very large size_t when passed to net_buf_simple_pull_mem(). In builds without assertions, this wraps the buffer length and advances the data pointer far out of bounds, so subsequent reads dereference invalid memory. A nearby BLE device can trigger this with a non-connectable advertisement carrying a UUID16 AD structure and a crafted length byte, with no pairing or prior association required, potentially leading to denial of service or arbitrary code execution.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4pm9-4v7f-x6gr Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.3 · zephyrprojectNVD modified 2026-10-15 23:17
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 1
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4pm9-4v7f-x6gr Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory