The FAB auth manager's Azure AD OAuth login defaulted `verify_signature=False` when decoding the ID token, so an attacker able to present a forged or unsigned (`alg:none`) ID token to the OAuth callback could bypass authentication and log in as an arbitrary user, including one holding the Admin role (CWE-347). Deployments running the FAB auth manager with the Azure AD OAuth login path under its default configuration are affected; the Authentik path already defaulted to `True`. This issue affects `apache-airflow-providers-fab` before 3.7.3. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-fab` 3.7.3, which defaults `verify_signature=True`.
Fix
Public exploits 2
- 0xdak/CVE-2026-59243_exploit PoC on GitHub
- MalHyuk/CVE-2026-59243 PoC on GitHub
Each line links to the index that lists it, never to exploit code. Exploit-DB's "verified" and a Metasploit rank of good or better count as verified; a PoC-in-GitHub entry is a repository's claim.
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/69374 Patch
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/x4784l7z00tl3gw4tv2dmvoon77rxgpl Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.8 · apacheNVD modified 2026-10-23 23:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:apache:apache-airflow-providers-fab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 3
- https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/69374 Patch
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/x4784l7z00tl3gw4tv2dmvoon77rxgpl Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/28/10 Mailing List, Third Party Advisory