PDF Reader MCP is a Model Context Protocol server for reading PDF documents. In versions 2.2.0 and later prior to 3.0.1, when `MCP_TRANSPORT=http` enables the opt-in HTTP server, `@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp` reads `MCP_API_KEY` and logs that `X-API-Key` authentication is enabled but never validates the `X-API-Key` header on incoming requests. The `/mcp` endpoint consequently accepts unauthenticated clients. With the default bind address of `0.0.0.0`, any client able to reach the port can invoke every PDF tool and read any PDF the server process can open on the host, despite the misleading authentication-enabled startup log. URL-based sources additionally permit limited server-side request forgery; private and loopback destinations are blocked by default unless `--allow-private-ips` is set. The default `stdio` transport is unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.5 · sylphxaiNVD modified 2026-10-30 18:32
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 4
- https://github.com/SylphxAI/anymd/security/advisories/GHSA-q344-5v34-gm84 x_refsource_confirm
- https://github.com/SylphxAI/anymd/pull/332 x_refsource_misc
- https://github.com/SylphxAI/anymd/commit/4c35f72862d729301e3912ab8c8317d2828cf4c2 x_refsource_misc
- https://github.com/SylphxAI/anymd/tree/v3.0.1 x_refsource_misc