CVE-2026-63923

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() in drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/ octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c queues a sender-controlled REP_EVENT_NOTIFY request body verbatim, and rvu_rep_up_notify() then forwards event->pcifunc (the nested body field, distinct from the AF-normalised header pcifunc) into rvu_get_pfvf(), rvu_get_pf() and the AF->PF mailbox device index without any bounds check. A VF attached to a PF that has been put into switchdev representor mode reaches this path: the VF mailbox handler otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() forwards every message id including MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_NOTIFY to AF without an allowlist, and the AF dispatcher rewrites only msg->pcifunc, leaving struct rep_event::pcifunc attacker-controlled. The sibling rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg() refuses requests whose header pcifunc is not rvu->rep_pcifunc; this handler has no equivalent gate. An out-of-range body pcifunc selects an &rvu->pf[]/&rvu->hwvf[] element past the allocated array and, for RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE, turns into a six-byte attacker-chosen OOB ether_addr_copy() target inside the queued worker; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write in rvu_rep_wq_handler. Reject malformed requests at the handler entry by gating on is_pf_func_valid(), which is already the canonical PF/VF range check in this driver; expose it via rvu.h so callers in rvu_rep.c can use it instead of open-coding the same range arithmetic.