RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, protected tag bypass via bulk-delete. dELETE /api/users/:name refuses to delete users tagged protected (rabbitmgmtwmuser:deleteresource/2 checks isprotecteduser). POST /api/users/bulk-delete iterates the supplied username list and calls rabbitauthbackendinternal:deleteuser/2 directly , that function has no protected-tag check , so the guard is silently An administrator can delete protected-tagged service accounts via the bulk endpoint, bypassing a safeguard the test suite confirms is rabbitmqmanagement enabled Attacker has the administrator tag A protected-tagged user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 2.1 · broadcomNVD modified 2026-10-15 20:07
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:broadcom:rabbitmq_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 4
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/commit/e5b890a64b42ec1f79a8e9d735512150cf77479c Patch
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6 Release Notes
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-j9m2-hw6x-rqr9 Exploit, Third Party Advisory
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-j9m2-hw6x-rqr9 Exploit, Third Party Advisory