Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 2
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426 Patch
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-p3pc-g8m5-hrrr Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.5 · giteaNVD modified 2026-10-13 17:16
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:gitea:gitea:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*