BaselineWatch
Desk

CVE-2026-75595

9.1 critical SSVC exploitation: none Analyzed

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.

Fix

Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 5

Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.

Change history 1

  1. First seenCVSS 9.1 · nettyNVD modified 2026-10-26 10:10

Affected (CPE criteria) 1

  • cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

References 7