Punk::OAuth2::Server versions through 0.03 for Perl issue access tokens outside a client's registered scopes and grant types because no authorization path reads them. Punk::OAuth2::Server::Store registers scopes and grant_types per client and documents both as client registration. token dispatches on the grant_type in the request body, so a client registered for authorization_code alone can ask for client_credentials, and that arm passes the requested scope straight to the minter, which signs it into the at+jwt access token. authorize copies the query scope into the authorization code record without comparing it against the registration, leaving the optional consent hook as the only check between an arbitrary scope and the issued code. redirect_uris on the same client row is read and enforced. A registered client can obtain a correctly signed token carrying any scope it names, and a resource server running Punk::OAuth2::Checker accepts that token and honours the scope. A client registered without a secret authenticates on its client_id alone, so anyone who knows that identifier can request one.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 9.1NVD modified 2026-10-15 19:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.03/view/lib/Punk/OAuth2/Server/Store.pm
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.04/changes
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/22/6