Reverse::Proxy versions before 0.04 for Perl allow HTTP request smuggling via a percent-decoded PATH_INFO written unencoded to the upstream request line. PSGI hands PATH_INFO to an application percent-decoded, so a %XX sequence in the client URL has become a raw byte by the time the proxy sees it. The proxy appends that byte string to the upstream base URL, and for an Upgrade tunnel writes it into a request line it serializes itself, re-encoding nothing in either path. The HTTP client that sends the resulting URL does not validate the target either. A path containing %0d%0a therefore arrives at the upstream as a CRLF that ends the request line, and a decoded space, '?' or '#' truncates it the same way. Everything the client writes after the CRLF is read by the upstream as a second request. On the buffered path it arrives on a keep-alive connection the proxy pools and reuses for other clients. Its method, path and headers are all chosen by the client, and the upstream attributes it to the proxy, so it reaches upstream paths that the proxy's own routing does not expose.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.3NVD modified 2026-10-14 13:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.03/source/Proxy.xs#L386-399
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.03/source/Proxy.xs#L654-666
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.04/changes
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.04/source/Proxy.xs#L400-426
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/23/2